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BACKGROUND 
 
On 13
th
 March 2012, the Court of Appeal delivered its reserved judgement 
in R v A,
1
 an appeal against conviction for the offence of perverting the course 
of justice. The appellant had made allegations of multiple rape and domestic 
violence perpetrated against her by her husband, allegations she later 
withdrew, thereby giving rise to the charge of and subsequent conviction for 
perverting the course of justice. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. 
This was the second time this appellant‘s case had been referred on appeal, 
the Court having already heard an appeal against sentence on 23
rd
 November 
2010, when it quashed a prison sentence of eight months, and substituted a 
community sentence and supervision order. Whilst justice has prevailed and 
corrected the error of the draconian sentence, the conviction for perverting the 
course of justice following the retraction of a truthful allegation because of 
fear and pressure still stands. At present the case is being appealed further to 
the Supreme Court. 
The case of A, has generated national and international publicity
2
 due to a 
widespread concern that the prosecution of a domestic violence victim for 
withdrawing an allegation, where that withdrawal was motivated by fear of 
further abuse and pressure, amounted to a gross miscarriage of justice which 
would deter victims of rape and domestic violence, under similar 
circumstances, from reporting such assaults to the police. The serious 
consequences that flow from the deterrent effect of this anomalous 
prosecution on victim's reluctance to report to police and the risk to victims of 
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2 A Bershadski ―Complainants who Stop Complaining: Being Prosecuted for 
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further assault and/or death must be considered against the background of the 
seriousness and prevalence of rape and domestic violence. Two women die at 
the hands of their partners every year.
3
 In 2008, 101 women victims died 
following violence inflicted by a partner or ex partner. Seventy-six per cent of 
all domestic violence involves repeated incidents.
4
 Fifty-four per cent of 
women victims of serious sexual assault were assaulted by their partner or ex-
partner.
5
  
Over the last three decades police, prosecutors and the courts have been 
working towards improving the criminal justice system response and (mindful 
of their obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights Art 2 - 
right to life and Art 3 - right to be free from inhuman and degrading 
treatment), encouraging women to report violence to the police in the 
anticipation that the prosecution of such offences will prevent an otherwise 
escalating spiral of seriousness in domestic violence.
6
 The law of evidence has 
also introduced changes of benefit to victims of domestic violence. Wives are 
compellable witnesses against husbands,7 special measures and support for 
victims has been provided.8 Hearsay9 and bad character 10 provisions have been 
extended, where propensity evidence includes previous convictions, cautions, 
acquittals, and offences for which the person has not been charged. It may 
also include findings in civil proceedings,  
By 2009/10, 74,000 cases were prosecuted, and the conviction rate (which 
includes not guilty pleas resulting in conviction as well as pleas of guilt) was 
72 per cent.  
                                                   
3 K Smith (ed), S Osborne, I Lau and A Britton Homicides, Firearm Offences and 
Intimate Violence 2010/11: Supplementary Volume 2 to Crime in England and Wales 
2010/11 Table 1.05 p 38. See also http://bit.ly/NIGtQU. 
4 J Flatley, C Kershaw, K Smith, R Chaplin and  D Moon (2010) BCS - Crime in 
England and Wales 2009/10, Home Office, accessed at http://bit.ly/Mb8X06 p 24. 
5 Stern (2010) The Stern Review accessed at http://bit.ly/R7wp4O p 9. 
6 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28; 27 BHRC 159. See also Yildirim v Austria (V) 
CEDAW 6/2005 (6 August 2007), where a wife who made repeated applications for 
restraining orders to protect her from a husband‘s repeated threats to kill was 
ultimately killed by him. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women found a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). See also Goekce v 
Austria, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (2007) para 12.1.4; the court held that 
Austria had not done enough to protect where a husband killed a wife when 
restraining orders were in place, but there was a failure to adequately protect. See also 
Kontrovà v Slovakia (no. 7510/04), Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria (no. 71127/01), E S 
and Others v Slovakia (no. 8227/04), Hajduovà v  Slovakia (no. 2660/03). 
7 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s 80(2). 
8 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA 1999), s 17. 
9 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 116. See also R v Boulton [2007] EWCA Crim 942. 
10
 Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 101 and 112. 
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In addition, the introduction of independent domestic violence advisers 
(IDVAs) offering support to women through the process has resulted in a 
successful outcome in 73 per cent of the domestic violence cases where an 
IDVA is present.
11
 In 2005/06 there were 25 specialist domestic violence 
courts in 2011 this number had increased to 143.  
Given all this progress the prosecution of A for perverting the course of 
justice will undoubtedly undermine the confidence of women in the criminal 
justice system and deter them from reporting incidents of domestic violence 
which will have devastating consequences for women‘s safety. With regard to 
the CPS, the DPP has stated that since 2001 clear guidance had been issued to 
prosecutors on prosecuting domestic violence cases and that during 2005-
2008, there was a ―huge training exercise training all of our prosecutors on 
domestic violence.‖12 So what happened in A‘s case? In 2009/10 over 6,500 
domestic violence cases failed because the victim either failed to attend court 
or retracted her evidence. This has been a perennial problem which is being 
addressed in several ways including supporting victims throughout the 
prosecution process (with IDVAs), and allowing the admission of hearsay
13
 
and bad character
14
 evidence. It has been a grave error of judgement to have 
prosecuted A for retracting a truthful statement. 
 
FACTS 
 
‗Sarah‘ as the anonymous victim is referred to15 was subjected to domestic 
violence and rape. On 28
th
 November 2009, she made a police statement 
alleging that she had been raped by her husband. She was relocated to a 
Women's Refuge with her four children. Her husband was subsequently 
arrested and remanded in custody. On 10
th
 December, at a preliminary 
hearing, he was released on conditional bail, with a specific condition that he 
should not directly or indirectly contact any prosecution witness. On 21
st
 
December Sarah said she wished to withdraw the allegation and on 7
th
 January 
2010, she stated that she wished to withdraw the complaint although she still 
maintained that it was true. On 18
th
 January 2010, a plea and case 
                                                   
11 IDVAs are trained specialists who provide a service to victims, who are at high risk 
of harm from intimate partners, ex-partners or family members, with the aim of 
securing their safety and the safety of their children. See http://bit.ly/OIOZOn. 
12 See http://bit.ly/OCpRKz speech by the director of public prosecutions, Keir 
Starmer QC, accessed June 3rd 2012. 
13 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 116. 
14 Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 101 and 112. 
15 A victim of rape is entitled to anonymity since Sexual Offences Amendment Act 
1976 (see House of Commons Anonymity in Rape Cases Standard Note SN/HA/4746, 
last updated: 7 February 2012). 
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management hearing took place, and the husband entered ‗not guilty‘ pleas. 
On 7
th
 February in a telephone conversation with the police she said that her 
original statement was not true and on 11
th
 February she went to the police 
station and made a statement that her original allegation was also untrue. On 
12
th
 February, at Mold Crown Court, no evidence was offered against her 
husband in connection with the six counts of rape and not guilty verdicts were 
recorded. This sequence of facts and subsequent withdrawal of allegations of 
violence by women are typical in these cases. It is usual in the UK 
jurisdiction, and in others, that the case ends there, and as has already been 
stated the prosecution case fails.
16
 
 
CROWN COURT TRIAL 
 
Unusually, the CPS and police in North Wales decided however to 
proceed against Sarah. On 16
th
 April 2010, she was formally arrested and 
interviewed under caution and told the police that her original allegations had 
been false. She was then charged with two counts of perverting the course of 
justice that, ―... between the 7th day of February 2010 and the 30th day of July 
2010, with intent to pervert the course of public justice, did a series of acts, 
namely made and pursued a false retraction of her complaints of rape against 
… her spouse which had a tendency to pervert the course of public justice.‖17 
On 15
th
 October 2010, she was arraigned on two counts of perverting the 
course of justice (Count one that she had made a false allegation and Count 
two that she had made a false retraction). She pleaded ‗not guilty‘ to the first 
count, and ‗guilty‘ to the second count. In cases involving allegations of rape 
and domestic violence charges of perverting the course of justice will only be 
brought where it is considered that the complainant has made a false 
allegation or else against the perpetrator of the violence for witness 
intimidation. Few, if any cases proceed against victims where it is the 
retraction of a complaint of rape or domestic violence which is considered to 
be false. In Sarah‘s case the determination of the prosecutors to secure a 
conviction against her is self evident since both her statements were made the 
subject of separate counts ensuring that a conviction would be inevitable since 
one statement was certainly false. 
Following her conviction for perverting the course of justice in relation to 
Count 2 - retracting a true statement and declaring it to be false, there was a 
public outcry in which the DPP, Keir Starmer, went on public record as 
saying that ―I do not consider justice was done or was seen to be done‖18 
                                                   
16 Case attrition in domestic violence case is much researched. 
17R v A [2012] EWCA Crim 434. 
18
 Keir Starmer, The Guardian 16 Dec 2010. 
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paraphrasing the aphorism of McCarthy 1924.
19
 Following this the CPS 
instituted a consultation exercise, and subsequently published what it 
considered to be fresh guidance to prosecutors on how to deal with what it 
called ―double retractions‖ in such cases. I will comment on this in detail 
below. 
 
COURT OF APPEAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE 
 
On 23
rd
 November 2010, the Court of Appeal before the Lord Chief 
Justice of England and Wales (Lord Judge), Mr Justice Calvert-Smith, Mr 
Justice Griffith Williams, considered Sarah‘s appeal against sentence and 
quashed the sentence of imprisonment that had been imposed at Mold Crown 
Court,
20
 substituting instead a community sentence with a supervision order. 
However, as the Court of Appeal made clear, in her later appeal against 
conviction,
21
 the only reason a supervision order was made instead of a 
conditional discharge was that as she had spent three weeks in prison the care 
of her children needed regularising and supporting. Counsel for the appellant 
argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive pleading that insufficient 
account had been taken of: ―(i) her age; (ii) her good character; (iii) her 
admissions; (iv) the fact that she was the mother to four young children; and 
(v) the fact that her husband had placed her under great pressure to withdraw 
the complaint.‖ In considering each of these points the Court of Appeal 
acceded that the sentence was manifestly excessive, and made considerable 
comments in relation to the fifth ground. The Court of Appeal said this: 
 
―... the difference between the culpability of the individual who 
instigates a false complaint against an innocent man and the 
complainant who retracts a truthful allegation against a guilty man 
will often be very marked. Experience shows that the withdrawal of a 
truthful complaint of crime committed in a domestic environment 
usually stems from pressures, sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, 
sometimes immensely subtle, which are consequent on the nature of 
the individual relationship and the characters of the people who are 
involved in it. [21] Where a woman has been raped, and raped more 
than once by her husband or partner, the father of her children, the 
man in whom she is entitled to repose her trust, those very actions 
                                                   
19 R v Sussex Justices, Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256. 
20 R v A (false retraction of allegation of rape) [2010] EWCA Crim 2913. See also S 
Edwards ―The Duplicity of Protection—Prosecuting Frightened Victims: An Act of 
Gender-based Violence‖ (2012) 76 JCL 29-52. 
21
 R v A [2012] EWCA Crim 434. 
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reflect, and are often meant to reflect, manifestations of dominance, 
power and control over her. When these features of a relationship 
between a man and a woman are established, it is an inevitable 
consequence that the woman who has been so ill-treated becomes 
extremely vulnerable.‖  
 
Significantly, in considering the appeal against sentence the Court of 
Appeal was most influenced by the pressure she was placed under and also 
her fear of her husband and said this:  
 
―She stated, as recorded in a pre-sentence report, that her relationship 
with her husband had been an abusive one and that she had been under 
immense pressure to drop the complaint against him. She further 
stated that she had issued the retraction statement in fear of 
repercussions from her husband and in an effort to enable her children 
to enjoy Christmas with him... The sentencing court, when assessing 
culpability, should allow for the pressure the defendant would 
necessarily be exposed to and be guided by large measure of 
compassion for a woman already victimised. The instant case was 
very exceptional. The sentence for an offence of perverting the course 
of justice was normally custodial. But the instant case, which was 
exceptional, was not one such a case. The appropriate sentence was a 
community sentence with a supervision order.‖  
 
The Court of Appeal added that, ―the sentence for perverting the course of 
justice normally is, and will normally continue to be, a custodial sentence‖. 
This is not entirely true and it is worthy of note, perhaps, that from 1991-2000 
of a total of 16,925 defendants for trial at the Crown court, 13,245 were 
convicted, and of those 5,595 were sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and 
of those imprisoned 50 per cent were sentenced to up to four months 
imprisonment.
22
 In 2000, 9,763 offences of perverting the course of justice 
were recorded. In the same year 5,107 cases of perverting the course of justice 
were proceeded with in the magistrates' courts, of which 2,312 were dealt 
with in the Crown Court (Table 2). In 2009/10, a total of 7,997 offences of 
perverting the course of justice were recorded.
23
  
                                                   
22 Source: Data on defendants tried and/or sentenced compiled from Criminal 
Statistics: England and Wales, Supplementary Tables, Vol 2, Proceedings in the 
Crown Court, Table S2.1(A) for the respective years. 
23 R Chaplin, J Flatley and K Smith Crime in England and Wales 2010/11 Findings 
from the British Crime Survey and police recorded crime (2nd Edition) July 2011 
HOSB:10/11 Table 2.04 (contd) Recorded crime by offence, 1997 to 2010/11 and 
percentage change between 2009/10 and 2010/11 p 45. 
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COURT OF APPEAL - APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION 
 
On 15
th
 February 2012, in the Court of Appeal, before Lord Judge CJ, 
Silber, Maddison JJ, Sarah‘s counsel advanced the following arguments, (i) 
that she had been suffering from post traumatic stress at the time of retracting 
her true statement, (ii) that she had a defence of duress or marital coercion and 
(iii) that prosecutorial discretion was not exercised properly and under these 
circumstances a case should not have been brought. The Court of Appeal 
summarised the pressure, fear, guilt, isolation, responsibility for the children, 
and her desire to keep up a facade for their sakes that all was normal between 
her and their father. The court said “we can see no reason for concluding that 
in the context of the ingredients of this offence, the victim of a crime is 
entitled to be treated differently from any other witness to a serious offence 
who falsely retracts truthful evidence.‖24 There is every reason. This point I 
will address in the commentary. The Court of Appeal, on the duress point 
abided by the further limitations on the law of duress laid down by the House 
of Lords in Hasan,
25
 and accepted prosecution argument that ―that duress 
should not and cannot be confused with pressure,‖26 concluding that there is 
inconsistency between what the appellant said she was subjected to (in the 
appellants words) ―this mixture of pressure‖ and what her counsel argued 
existed as pressure in that there was violence. In this, the Court of Appeal 
misses the complexity of pressure for a victim of rape and domestic violence 
and the difficulty she has in describing her coercion in precise legal niceties.
27
 
The Court of Appeal with regard to sentencing did not consider itself 
powerless and stated ―The court is not powerless. In an appropriate case an 
order for absolute or conditional discharge will convey its distinct message.‖28 
But with regard to a finding of abuse of process it said, “even if it can be 
shown that in one respect or another, part or parts of the relevant guidance or 
                                                   
24 Para 58. 
25 [2005] 4 All ER 685. 
26 Para 63. 
27 It is worth noting that Sections 11 and 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
which itemise the grounds for nullity. Specifically, ground (c) in Section 12 states that 
a marriage shall be voidable if: ―…either party to the marriage did not validly consent 
to it, whether in consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise.‖ 
The leading cases are Hirani v Hirani [1982] 4 FLR 232, CA; Mahmud v Mahmud 
1993 SCLR 688; Sohrab v Khan 2002 SLT 1255. And the test is whether the threats 
or pressure were such as to overbear the will of the individual and not the earlier test 
of  threat to life and limb. And the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 
recognises the complexity of coercion s 63A states ―(6)In this Part— ‗force‘ includes 
coerce by threats or other psychological means (and related expressions are to be read 
accordingly)‖. 
28
 Para 83. 
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policy have not been adhered to, it does not follow that there was an abuse of 
process... Accordingly, we are not entitled to interfere with this conviction.‖29  
 
COMMENTARY 
 
The CPS was entirely wrong in bringing charges of perverting the course 
of justice against the appellant. Instead, the case against Sarah‘s husband 
should have proceeded. The Court of Appeal, whilst sympathetic with the 
predicament of the appellant, both at the appeal against sentence and the 
appeal against conviction seemed more willing to entertain pressure and 
duress arguments in mitigation of sentence than when they were advanced in 
support of a defence of duress. In this latter regard the opportunity to develop 
the law on duress was not seized by the Court of Appeal.  
This is all very disappointing as the CPS has been working on 
understanding domestic violence and how to prosecute in such cases since its 
guidance in 1993. This U turn suggests a lack of case management and a lack 
of understanding of domestic violence and the need for a new concerted drive 
to raise awareness of domestic violence within the organisation. The issuing 
of new guidelines to prosecutors should ensure that where these circumstances 
arise again, as indeed they undoubtedly will, victims will not be prosecuted 
and the CPS will consult with the DPP over such cases. However, the new 
guidelines merely echo the previous guidelines and suggest more of a public 
relations exercise to conceal serious failings within the organisation. 
 
Perverting the course of justice  
 
Perverting the course of justice, an offence at common law, is triable on 
indictment only. Three types of conduct are most commonly indicated 
including, fabrication or disposal of evidence or inducing others to do so, 
intimidating a juror, witness or person assisting an investigation and harming 
or threatening to harm a witness, juror or person assisting an investigation.
30
 
Intimidating jurors
31
 causing death by dangerous driving
32
 concealing 
incriminating evidence
33
 driving offences,
34
 and making false allegations of 
                                                   
29 Paras 84 and 88. 
30 Perverting the course of justice is a charge that should be used where there is 
witness intimidation. See for example the case of the man who pressured his wife into 
withdrawing an allegation against him Grimsby Telegraph May 25 2012. 
31 R v Curtis (Stephanie) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2012] EWCA Crim 
945. 
32 R v Gray (Barry Paul) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 03 May 2012, R v Afzal 
(Mohammed) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2012] EWCA Crim 10. 
33
 R v Yaman (Tolga) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2012] EWCA Crim 1075. 
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assault,
35
 provide such examples. The person who retracts a truthful statement 
because of fear is not usually proceeded against. Indeed the CPS, in its own 
public information, point to the concern with perverting the course of justice, 
as involving cases where ―there is a possibility that what the suspect has done 
‗without more‘ might lead to a wrongful consequence, such as the arrest of an 
innocent person (Murray (1982) 75 Cr. App. R. 58) or a false allegation has 
been made‖. The CPS has only proceeded against a victim who retracts a 
truthful allegation in less than a handful of cases in the last three decades. The 
use of such proceedings to manage the frightened domestic violence witness 
is an oppressive and vindictive abuse of the victim. In 1989, Michelle 
Renshaw was assaulted by her boyfriend Michael Williams and was 
proceeded against for contempt of court for refusing to give evidence at the 
trial stage. Pickles J went on to say that it was Michelle Renshaw who failed 
the ‗court of women‘. The CPS in its new guidance it states: 
 
―8. The offence of perverting the course of justice in the context of 
rape and domestic violence covers the following situations: 
 
 Where someone makes a false allegation of rape or domestic 
violence. (See paragraph 10 and paragraphs 26-28 below.)  
 Where a complainant of rape or domestic violence retracts an 
allegation, whether false or true, an offence of perverting the 
course of justice may be committed. However, there may be 
credible reasons why a complainant of rape or domestic 
violence may retract a truthful allegation and prosecutors will 
need to ensure that the reasons for the retraction are fully 
explored and understood. (See paragraphs 12-16 and 
paragraph 24 below.)  
 Where a complainant of rape or domestic violence withdraws 
an earlier retraction (referred to in this guidance as a "double 
retraction"). (See paragraphs 17-19 and paragraph 29.) 
36
 
 
The new guidance ‗so called‘ actually did no more than to restate the 
relevant parts of existing CPS policy and reflected an effort to quell the 
                                                                                                                         
34 R v Jason Langley No: 2011/5738/A5 [2011] EWCA Crim 2716 2011 WL 
5828799. 
35 R v Clarke Criminal law – Sentence – Appeal against sentence – Defendant charged 
with perverting the course of justice – Defendant pleading guilty and sentenced to 15 
months' imprisonment – Whether sentence should have been suspended, [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2076, (Transcript: Wordwave International Ltd (A Merrill 
Communications)).  
36
 http://bit.ly/Qo6KCU accessed 1 June 2011. 
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rightly indignant public reaction to the treatment of the victim in the 
immediate case. The Court of Appeal neither at the hearing against sentence 
nor at the hearing against conviction made any comment on the exercise of 
discretion by the CPS. Yet, in the earlier case of R v Bird and Holt,
37
 where 
the victims of domestic violence were too frightened to give evidence against 
the perpetrator the Court of Appeal was indeed critical of the CPS and asked 
why the original statements of the two women had not been admitted under 
the hearsay provisions. In the immediate case one must ask why Sarah‘s 
husband was not prosecuted and why Sarah‘s contradictory statements were 
not tested in court and the jury left to decide which of the two inconsistent 
statements was true especially as the police were inclined to believe that the 
first statement was the true statement. There is authority for this approach.
38
 
In R v Smith (Rocky),
39
 the victim of domestic violence retracted her original 
police statement because of fear; the judge granted the prosecution application 
to treat her as a hostile witness. She was cross-examined by the prosecution 
who put in evidence her earlier statement. In R v Bashir,
40
 a wife was treated 
as a hostile witness. 
The Court of Appeal was correct however on their view that a conditional 
discharge would have been appropriate. Sentencing principles are articulated 
in R v Livesey (John)
41
as laid down in R v Tunney,
42
 where Stanley Burnton J, 
said:  
 
―10. In our judgment the sentence which is appropriate for offences of 
this nature depends effectively on three matters … The particular 
factors which the court must have regarded to are, first, the 
seriousness of the substantive offence to which the perverting of the 
course of justice relates. Here the offence in question, 
murder/manslaughter, was at the most serious end of the spectrum. 
The second matter which the court must have regard to is the degree 
of persistence in the conduct in question by the offender. Here there 
was a  degree of  persistence, although ultimately the appellant ceased 
to persist in his lies. Thirdly, one must consider the effect of the 
attempt to pervert the course of justice on the course of justice itself. 
                                                   
37 (1997) 161 JP 96, The Times (31 October 1996), Roch LJ, Jowitt J and Judge Ann 
Goddard QC. 
38 L Ellison ―Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim Participation‖ (2002) 65 
Modern Law Review Volume 834. 
39 [2009] EWCA Crim 2461. 
40 [2011] EWCA Crim 2763. 
41 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 2nd May 2012. 
42
 [2006] EWCA Crim 2066 and [2007] Cr App R (S) 91. 
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Here it was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the substantive offence of 
murder or manslaughter could scarcely have been more serious.‖ 
 
PRESSURES, FEAR AND LEGAL NICETIES IN THE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT 
 
At a time when the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 introduced a new 
offence of fear - loss of control manslaughter - it seems anomalous that the 
complexity of domestic violence and the factors which affect retraction of 
allegations is so little understood elsewhere in the criminal law. Sarah listed 
the pressures ―She said that everything had been done for her children so they 
could enjoy their Christmas‖ including withdrawing the allegation.43 The 
Court of Appeal noted, ―In the statement the Appellant asserted that she had 
been subjected to domestic abuse and had indeed been raped on three 
occasions. As to her reason for retracting her allegations to this effect, she 
said that her husband ―persuaded‖ her to do so on the basis that if she did not 
―any punishment (she) would suffer would be considerably less than that he 
would be subject to. She added that her husband was able to control her.‖44 
And yet they did not consider that her situation amounted to a duress defence 
nor were they willing to explore the current limitations of a duress defence 
and explore the issue of domestic violence within the current law. Nor did 
they consider her prosecution an abuse of process. 
All this happened at a time when the CPS published its Violence against 
Women and Girls Crime Report for 2010-11,
45
 in which it reports that the 
CPS has, improved its handling of cases of violence against women and girls 
(VAWG) in terms of both quality and quantity and that since 2006-07, 
prosecutions have risen from just under 69,000 to 95,000 - an increase of 38 
per cent. The DPP said: ―Crimes against women include some of the most 
pernicious and degrading offences that we prosecute. It is important for 
victims of these crimes that we continue to improve the service that we 
deliver, both within the CPS and with our partners in the criminal justice 
system.‖ Prosecutors in the UK at least in this immediate case have certainly 
demonstrated a U-turn in approaches to domestic violence and victims who 
because of fear and other pressures withdraw allegations. This is also sadly 
the case elsewhere where prosecutions for perjury may also be brought. The 
case of Dushkar Kanchan Singh v The Queen,
46
 before Elias CJ, Blanchard, 
Tipping, McGrath and William Young JJ, where the victim withdrew her 
                                                   
43 Para 16 Court of Appeal 13th March. 
44 Ibid, at para 31. 
45 Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report for 2010-11. CPS, London. 
46
 [2010] NZSC 161. See also IJEP 15 2 (170)1 April 2011. See also [2011] NZLJ 98. 
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original allegation
47
 against her partner who was charged with nineteen counts 
of violence against her, is instructive. At the trial, the complainant 
contradicted what she had said in her original statement and was subsequently 
treated as a hostile witness. The victim then invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination. The judge rejected this claim. Her partner was convicted of 
assault. On appeal he contested the judges‘ refusal to accept her claim to the 
self-incrimination privilege. The appellants case was that her inconsistent 
statements might later form the basis for a prosecution for perjury should she 
give evidence that supported the defence. The New Zealand Supreme Court 
per William Young J, stated that the privilege against self-incrimination 
belongs to the witness and can only be invoked in relation to information 
which, if provided, would be 'likely' to incriminate the person claiming the 
privilege and that a defendant cannot object to a prosecution witness waiving 
privilege. He went on to say that there was no realistic risk of the Crown using 
the prior inconsistent statements to prosecute her, if the evidence she gave at 
trial incriminated the defendant. However this was not the case if the evidence 
she gave at trial was not incriminatory explaining that the only substantial risk 
of prosecution was in relation to any evidence exculpating the defendant. He 
said this:  
 
―[33] A complainant in a domestic violence case who defeats a 
prosecution by reneging on prior statements might, conceivably, be 
prosecuted. For instance, if she acknowledges that her original 
complaint was false, she might be prosecuted for making a false 
complaint (but presumably only if the police are satisfied that the 
complaint was indeed false). Alternatively, she might be prosecuted 
for attempting to defeat the course of justice (if the police take the 
view that the alleged offending took place).‖48 
 
In addition, the new plans to criminalise forced marriage
49
 have stated that 
victims will be guaranteed that they will not be forced to support a 
prosecution against their wishes, presumably that also means they will not be 
proceeded against for perverting the course of justice should they withdraw 
the allegation. 
                                                   
47 Ibid ―[6] The appellant and Ms D met in early 2006 and became engaged. The 
appellant was a police officer and had many years experience as a policeman both in 
New Zealand and overseas. Ms D is not a New Zealand citizen. She moved to New 
Zealand a few months after she met the appellant and began living with him. She was 
on a visitor‘s permit and dependent on the appellant‘s sponsorship to remain in New 
Zealand‖. 
48 Ibid. 
49
 See http://bit.ly/MiBu9W accessed June 12th 2012. 
